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Senate from Virginia, despite being a resident of the District of
Columbia. Where would the courts go with that?
Is it possible, is it conceivable, that a mere redrawing of a political
boundary would constitute a proper loss of representation in Congress?
I doubt it.
So it seems to me the nature of your deliberations are therefore
foreordained. It is clear the District deserves representation. This issue
should not be debated another 100 years.
Just as 100 years ago the Senate Parks Commission left a great legacy
to the city with its plan to commemorate the centennial with a grand
new plan for the physical heart of the city, it is time for us as we
approach the 200th anniversary of our location here on the Potomac
River to give us something to celebrate for the bicentennial year in the
year 2000, and that could only be the full rights of citizenship which has
been denied for 200 years.
Thank you very much.
III. THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: IS THERE A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE AND BE REPRESENTED?
PROFESSOR SARGENTICH: Thank you very much. Today, we have
a panel that it is my pleasure to introduce, a number of distinguished
people to discuss and to debate the essential constitutional question
here: Is there a constitutional right to vote and be represented? What
are its dimensions? Where does it come from? What are its limits?
As the panel members come up, I will introduce them from your
right to your left Edward Still is the Director of the Voting Rights
Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. He has
been an adjunct professor at the University of Alabama School of Law.
He has worked in federal litigation and civil rights and employment
litigation for a number of years, has argued three cases before the
United States Supreme Court, and has argued dozens of other cases in
Alabama and represented the plaintiffs. He has served as the chair of
the Center for Voting and Democracy, and is a prolific author in this
area.
Professor Gary Peller is a professor of law at Georgetown University,
where he teaches, among other things, constitutional law, criminal
procedure, and jurisprudence. Gary Peller clerked forJudge Lasker, in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and has
served as Co-secretary of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. He
has written a number of important works in the fields of legal theory
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and legal history.
The moderator of our panel today is Professor Jeff Rosen of the
George Washington University. He is also the Legal Affairs Editor of
The New Republic, where he writes important pieces on constitutional
politics. Jeff served as clerk for ChiefJudge Mikva on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and has published articles in a
wide range of publications, including The New Yorker, The New York
Times, and a number of law reviews.
Brenda Wright is the Managing Attorney of the National Voting
Rights Institute in Boston, Massachusetts. Prior to joining the institute,
she served as director of the Voting Rights Project at the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, where she litigated numerous
voting rights cases throughout the United States. In 1997 she
successfully argued the first Supreme Court case involving the Motor
Voter Law, and she is the author of several law review articles in this
field.
To complete the panel, James Gardner is a professor of law at
Western New England College of Law, where he teaches constitutional
law. Prior to teaching, he served as a trial attorney in the Civil Division
of the U.S. Department ofJustice and, more recently, as a cooperating
attorney for the New York Civil Liberties Union. He also has published
extensively on voting rights, in numerous law journals, and has a
forthcoming book entitled State Expansion of Federal Constitutional
Liberties.
A distinguished panel. I regret that I will have to leave now for class.
But I take solace in the fact that this is being taped and that I and my
students can observe this panel and the succeeding events carefully.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR ROSEN (MODERATOR): Thank you so much, Tom.
What a pleasure it is to moderate such a distinguished panel on such an
important topic: Is there a constitutional right to vote?
I was struck by the very different answers to that question that we
heard even in the introductory statements. Dean Grossman and
Professor Gillette both talked about the right to vote as a fundamental
right of citizenship, constitutive and protective of all other rights.
Surely this notion, call it the modern notion of the right to vote, is
deeply embedded in our voting rightsjurisprudence today.
But if we were to ask the Framers of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, the amendments that are at the center of voting rights
litigation, what they thought about the matter, they would have a very
different answer.
How can I state this so confidently? Because in fact, the Framers were
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asked. They were asked, and they gave us an answer. To talk about that
answer, I want to tell you about the story of John Bingham and Victoria
Woodhull.
John Bingham is, of course, the James Madison of Reconstruction,
the framer of the Fourteenth Amendment. Victoria Woodhull, the
subject of Barbara Goldsmith's fascinating new biography,4 is
remembered today more as a sexual radical than an advocate of
political suffrage. But in fact, the two arguments were in her mind
combined. Woodhull's free love ideas were based on the same
philosophy of individual rights as her suffrage arguments.
She said that individuals had an inalienable right to make and
dissolve sexual relationships as they desired. The right of sexual self-
determination was derived from what Woodhull characterized as our
theory of government based on the sovereignty of the individual, which
itself included the fundamental right to vote.
Woodhull is best remembered because of her participation in a
scandal that presaged the drama that is amusing us today. Woodhull
exposed an adulterous affair between Henry Ward Beecher, the
charismatic minister and the scion of the eminent reformer family, and
his parishioner, Elizabeth Tilton.
Woodhull wrote about the affair in the Salon magazine of its day.
The articles so inflamed respectable opinion that poor Victoria
Woodhull was hounded by the Kenneth Starr of the Gilded Age,
Anthony Comstock, who prosecuted her for her obscene lectures and
her writings about free love, and indicted her because of her
unconventional ideas.
But in 1871, just a few years before her showdown with Beecher,
Victoria Woodhull presented a petition to John Bingham and the
House Judiciary Committee. She argued that the right to vote was so
fundamental that it was protected by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, and therefore, she argued, women's suff-age was, in fact,
constitutional before the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.
What was Victoria Woodhull's argument to the House Judiciary
Committee? First, she said, pointing to the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the right to vote is inherent in national
citizenship. The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment declares:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States... are citizens of
the United States." Victoria Woodhull said that U.S. citizenship
included the right to vote.
41. See BARBARA GOLDSMrTH, OTmER POWERS: THE AGE OF SUFFRAGE, SPIRITUALISM, AND THE
SCANDALOUSVICTORIAWOODHULL (1999).
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Second, she said that the Fifteenth Amendment, although it seems to
prohibit only discrimination because of race, also prohibits denial or
abridgement of the right to vote on account of sex. Women, white and
black, said Woodhull, belonged to races, although to different races.
The right to vote can't be denied on account of color. Therefore, all
people included in the term "color" have the right to vote unless
otherwise prohibited. [his was a very creative argument.
What did the House Judiciary Committee say? John Bingham, the
framer of the Fourteenth Amendment told us his views, and we don't
often get this kind of direct evidence in constitutional jurisprudence.
No one asked James Madison what he thought the First Amendment
meant. ButJohn Bingham was presented with the Woodhull petition,
and what was his response? His response was, Sorry, Miss Woodhull. I
know what the Fourteenth Amendment means. I wrote it, and you lose.
Why? I have got a lot of arguments, said Bingham, and they are based
on text, history, and structure. This is an easy question.
Why was it obvious to the Committee on Reconstruction that women
were not guaranteed the right to vote by the Fourteenth Amendment?
First, said Bingham, the Fourteenth Amendment merely granted
federal protection for privileges or immunities already guaranteed by
Article IV. It didn't create or transform the relationship between the
state and federal governments. It merely guaranteed enforcement for
these preexisting privileges or immunities.
Why was it obvious to everyone during the Reconstruction Era that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV did not protect the
right to vote? Because clearly a citizen from Massachusetts who traveled
to South Carolina and asserted a right to vote in South Carolina
elections based on temporary residence would be laughed out of town.
It was only fundamental private law rights, such as rights of contract and
property, that could be extended to all citizens and carried from state
to state. These, therefore, are the fundamental privileges or
immunities of citizenship. That is the first thing Bingham said.
That is an argument about history and structure. Then he made an
argument about text. The second section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the section that women's suffrage advocates feared most
of all, Bingham interpreted in precisely the way that they had hoped
that he wouldn't.
He said the presence of the word "male" in Section 2, the fact that
apportionment is reduced only when suffrage is denied to the male
population, makes it clear that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had no expectation that women as well as men had a
fundamental preexisting right to vote. Elizabeth Cady Stanton had
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feared the insertion of a term of caste, and Bingham fulfilled her fears.
So Bingham invoked text, history, structure, and also personal
authority-I know what it meant; I wrote it-in rejecting Victoria
Woodhull's petition.
I won't belabor the point But the same arguments were embodied
in precedent, just three years later, in Minor v. Happersett,42 when the
Supreme Court in 1874 rejected Victoria Miner's assertion of a right to
vote under the Fourteenth Amendment. ChiefJustice Wade rehearsed
precisely these arguments.
He talked about history. When the federal constitution was adopted,
all states with the exception of Rhode, Island and Connecticut had
constitutions of their own, and in no state were all citizens permitted to
vote. Wade noted that the right to vote was restricted on the grounds of
property ownership and literacy. He pointed to Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment as pretty clear evidence that women weren't
meant to be included.
Then he talked about the Republican Form of Government Clause
and said that all the states had republican governments when the
Constitution was adopted. In all except for New Jersey, however, the
right of suffirage was only bestowed on men. Under these
circumstances, he concluded it is certainly too late now to contend that
a government is not republican within the meaning of the guarantee of
the Constitution because women are not made voters.
So in the 1870s it was uncontroversial: Text, history, structure, and
precedent all said that the light to vote is not fundamental.
Let's fast forward now to the modem era and to Professor Jamie
Raskin's fascinating paper that we will all have the chance to read and
discuss. It's hard not to be struck by the difference in our modem
conception of voting rights. When we look at the collection of cases
thatJamie Raskin has collected, wejust find statements that express this
drastically different view.
Wesbeny v. Sanders.43
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having
a voice in the election of those who make the laws under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the
most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our
Constitution leaves no room for classifications of people in a
way that unnecessarily abridges this right.44
42. 88 US. 162 (1874).
43. 376U.S. 1 (1964).
44. Id. at 17-18.
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Evans v. Comman, 5 a case on which Professor Raskin puts great
emphasis, struck down the state of Maryland's disenfranchisement of
American citizens living on the grounds of the National Institutes of
Health, a federal enclave. The Court held that by disenfranchising
these citizens, Maryland was breaking the "citizen's link to his laws and
government, [that] is protective of all fundamental rights and
privileges."'
Then, of course, there is Reynolds v. Sims,47 the most famous of all
voting rights cases, the case that Chief Justice Warren considered the
most important of his chiefjusticeship, which says: "The conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments, can only mean one thing-one person, one vote."48
That is an incredibly suggestive sentence, isn't it? It suggests that far
from being a positive law right, created by the Constitution, perhaps the
right to vote is a preexisting natural right declared by the Constitution
but not created by it.
This in fact was the argument of Victoria Woodhull, the women's
suffi-age advocates, and the most radical Reconstruction Republicans,
such as Charles Sumner. Sumner insisted that the right to vote was a
natural right constitutive of other rights. Many of the women's suffrage
advocates felt similarly.
You have here today a distinguished panel, a group that could not be
better prepared to answer the question that I will take the liberty of
setting for them. They, of course, will feel free to redefine the question
and tell me why this is the wrong question to ask.
I am struck by the dramatic evolution from the nineteenth-century
vision, when it was pretty obvious to everyone that the right to vote was
not constitutionally fundamental, and the modem vision in which we
have a very different view.
And I'd like our panelists today to help us trace that evolution and
make some sense out of this fascinating change. We are going to go
proceed in alphabetical order, and I will begin by asking Professor
Gardner to start.
PROFESSOR GARDNER: Thanks very much. I think the story that
Professor Rosen starts with is a good one because it shows something
that has been with us from the very beginning-a disjunction between
the popular understanding of voting and democracy and the official
45. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
46. Seeid.at422.
47. 377 U.S. 533 (1954).
48. Id at 558 (quoting Grayv. Sanders, 372 US. 368,381 (1963)).
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legal structure that has been implemented, particularly in the
Constitution. You can go back even further-the Electoral College, for
example. The theory of the Electoral College was that people were
supposed to vote for wise individuals who would then deliberate among
themselves and choose a President. It didn't work that way from day
one. Nobody would vote for electors unless they knew whom those
electors were going to support for President So dearly, the people of
this country have always felt entitled to a good deal more direct
democratic control than the Constitution has provided them.
I first want to break down the question that this panel has been asked
to address: Is there a constitutional right to vote? It is very broad and
covers an unmanageable amount of ground. The Supreme Court has
an extensive voting lights jurisprudence, as you know, and it is
exceptionally confusing. I don't know of any other area of
constitutional law where the Court has said such contradictory things.
It has said, for example, that the Constitution undeniably protects the
right to vote in state and federal elections. 9 It has said that the right to
vote is the most fundamental of all rights because it is preservative of all
others. ° At the same time, it has also said-and in contemporaneous
cases-that the Constitution does not confer the right of suffi-age upon
anyone,"' and that the right to vote is not a constitutionally protected
right 52 Well, which is it?
One way to manage this contradiction is to refine the question a little
bit The right to vote covers at least four broad categories of questions.
I want to just lay them out for you in what I take to be their order of
logical priority. The first question is: Must an office even be filled by
election? That is, can an office be appointive or must it be filled by
election? That is a question that gets to the scope of democratic self-
government itself. The second question is: If an office is filled by
election, who can cast a ballot? That is the question of the extension of
suffiage. A third question that often arises is: If there is an election and
people can cast ballots, for whom may they cast those ballots? That is
usually couched as an issue of ballot access. The fourth question is:
When there is an election, how do the votes have to be counted and
weighed? That is usually considered to be a question of vote dilution or
the one person, one vote standard.
As we go from the more logically prior questions to the more
subsidiary questions, the Court has actually had a lot more to say. It has
49. See Reynofds, 377 US. at 554.
50. SmickWo v. Hopkins, 118 US. 356,370 (1886).
51. &eMinorv. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162,178 (1874).
52. &eSanAntonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 35 n.78 (1973).
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had very little to say about the more fundamental and logically prior
questions. What that means is that the Court has been addressing the
more specific and subsidiary questions without any kind of developed
background, principle, theory or philosophy that could guide it. That,
I think, accounts for a lot of the confusion.
When we are talking about the District of Columbia and the right to
vote, we are talking about the first two kinds of questions that I
mentioned. The first question is whether District residents can vote for
Congress. That is a question of the extension of the franchise. Then
there is another question, which is whether D.C. residents are entitled
to an elective sub-national legislature, whether it is the D.C. Council or
whether it is Congress acting in some kind of discrete local capacity. So
those are questions that fall into these more general, more
fundamental areas where the Court has given much less guidance than
in some other areas.
Let me lay out for you what I take to be the Court's current position
on these two questions, and I'll take them in reverse order. First, does
the U.S. Constitution grant individuals a right to an elective sub-
national legislature, like a state legislature? I think the Court's answer
here is yes and no. There is only one clause of the U.S. Constitution
that really deals with this directly, and that is the Guarantee Clause,
which guarantees to the states a republican form of government."'
Certainly the notion of a republican form of government seems to
contemplate an elective legislature. But the Court has held that all
Guarantee Clause issues are nonjusticiable because they raise political
questions.'" So if there is any right to an elective state legislature, it is
notjudicially enforceable.
The second question is: Does the U.S. Constitution grant individuals
a right to cast ballots in federal elections? Again, I think where the
Court is right now is yes and no. The Constitution, says that
representatives and senators must be elected. But by whom? The
Court has consistently refused to hold that the U.S. Constitution grants
anyone a substantive right to vote, which is to say there is nobody in the
country who can simply present themselves and say without more, "I am
entitled to vote for Congress."
It is useful here to compare the U.S. Constitution to the various state
constitutions. The state constitutions clearly do, every one of them,
grant a substantive right to vote. The documents set out qualifications
for electors, and if you meet those qualifications, then you have a right
53. SeeU.S. CONST. art. IV., § 4.
54. SeeLutherv. Bordea,48U.S. 1,46-47 (1849).
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to vote in those state elections. The U.S. Constitution has a completely
different structure, which is the result of-as so many things on
important issues were-a compromise. The U.S. Constitution doesn't
set out qualifications for voters in federal elections. What it does is
incorporate by reference whatever qualifications the states have chosen
to grant to their own citizens.
Now that is a bizarre structure. That structure has led the U.S.
Supreme Court to a bizarre place, I think, which is this: The Court has
treated the right to vote only as a relative right under the Equal
Protection Clause. So what they say is, if and to the extent that a state
chooses to grant to its own people the right to vote for its own state
legislature, then to that extent and no further do the people of that
state also have a right to vote for members of Congress. Furthermore,
the extension of the franchise under those circumstances has to pass
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because the Court
treats the right to vote as a fundamental right for equal protection
purposes. That is where I think the Court is.
Let me say very briefly why I think the Court's answers to these
questions really stink. I'll start doctrinally. Doctrinally, the Court has
created just enormous confusion by these conflicting pronouncements.
Secondly, it seems to me that denying that the U.S. Constitution
grants a substantive right to vote to people has got to be wrong. I think
the Court on some level understands that and feels very skittish about it.
Why else would they have made this end run and created this strange
anomaly of a right which is so fundamental that it cannot be abridged
except consistent with strict scrutiny, yet it receives no direct substantive
protection under the Constitution? It is a kind of a "springing
fundamental right." When you have something like that, it seems to
me, that is a sign of a problem.
The problem, I think, is on a deeper level-the Court is running
away from certain issues. I think that is unfortunate in this area because
it seems to me that if there is anything that a constitution ought to do, it
ought to set out the ground rules by which a polity conducts its own
political system. It should set up a structure. For the Court to avoid
articulating what that structure is, and even to fail to acknowledge that
the Constitution establishes a structure like that, remands to the
political process the very issues that ought to decide how the political
process itself is shaped. So I think it is a bad place to be.
Can anything good be said for the Court's position? Yes. I think the
best that can be said for the Court's position is that it is probably
faithful to the views of the original Framers of the Constitution. That is
certainly not trivial. The Framers, I think it is fair to say, did not see
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voting as particularly important They were highly suspicious of
democracy. They associated it with mob rule. I think it is also fair to say
they didn't think of it as an especially important safeguard of liberty. As
far as they were concerned, the safeguards of liberty that they put into
the Constitution were federalism and separation of powers in the first
instance, and then a bill of rights that was judicially enforceable in the
second instance. I am sure they thought that direct control-and I am
saying direct control-of national officials was a nice, wise safeguard.
But I don't think they viewed it as the primary line of defense. I think
they viewed it as the last line of defense of the liberties that the
Constitution was designed to protect.
Now as a nation, though-and this is what Professor Rosen was
getting at-as a nation we have lived through a dramatic evolution in
our attitude toward voting. We have gone through the Jacksonian
period; we have gone through Populism; we have gone through
Progressivism, all of which were movements that placed a high value on
direct popular control of government.
Now the main impact of these developments has been felt mostly on
the state level-expansion of suffrage, home rule, the election of
multiple executive branch officials, initiative, recall, referendum. These
are state-level developments. But to some extent, the same influence is
felt in the federal document There has been the constant narrowing
of the permissible grounds of disenfranchisement.s5 There has been
direct election of senators.- So that, I think, is the best that can be said
for the Court's position.
I guess my problem with it ultimately is that this defense of the
Court's position flows from a deep and I think misguided commitment
to a very particular kind of constitutional interpretation, which is an
originalism that is not only rigid but sort of willfully blind, blind to the
developments in constitutional thought that have taken place since the
framing.
Just to bring it home to the question of the pending lawsuit, I think
that arguments that the Corporation Counsel is advancing will succeed
only if the District Court is willing to engage in a kind of constitutional
interpretation that the federal courts have been pretty clearly instructed
from on high not to engage in.
Thanks.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Thanks so much, Professor Gardner.
Professor Peller.
55. See, eg., US. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
56. SeeU.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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PROFESSOR PELLER: Good morning, everybody. I want to say first
that I am honored to have been invited to participate in this program at
the American University, Washington College of Law. As Claudio
Grossman said earlier, this law school has become one of the really
exciting intellectual centers in legal education today. Professor Jamie
Raskin's work on voting rights in the District exemplifies the kind of
fresh new perspectives that have become the hallmark of scholarship
here during the last decade.
I want to offer a brief view from the Left of the legal and political
grounding for the movement for voting rights in the District. I should
say at the outset that, while I have some skepticism about the
underlying ideological message implicit in the focus on voting rights, I
do not want to be understood as criticizing Professor Raskin-upon
whose work much of the debate is proceeding. In fact, in his other
work, Raskin has taken positions that are very close to those that I will
be articulating here. In general, Raskin's other constitutional law work
has consistently emphasized a critique of the formalism of prevailing
interpretations of the Constitution: for example, he has argued that it
is not sufficient simply to have a formal right to vote in an election
context in which wealth is the practical prerequisite to mounting a
serious campaign for elective office.
5 7
Let me begin by picking up on the idea of a "springing constitutional
right" that Professor Gardner has articulated. The idea of a "springing
constitutional right" arises from a series of well-known Warren Court
decisions in which the Court held that the government may not provide
benefits to people on a basis that discriminates against the poor-even
if the government had no obligation to provide the underlying benefit
in the first place. I am thinking of cases like Griffin v. Illinois, in which
the Court required that once a State has in place a system for appellate
review of criminal convictions, it must provide indigents with free trial
transcripts in order to make the appeal right meaningful-even though
there is no constitutional obligation for a State to provide any appellate
review of criminal convictions. Similarly, the Warren Court held in
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections 9 that, although the Constitution
does not require that a state choose its legislature through elections, if a
state does provide for elections of state officials, it cannot deny
participation by charging a poll tax.
There are complicated and subtle reasons why the Warren Court's
57. &eJamin Raskin &Joan Bonifaz, EquaProtecion and the Wealth PNmay, 11 YALE L & POLY
REV. 273 (1993).
58. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
59. 383 US. 663 (1966).
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very best cases--as I would characterize Griffin and Harper-stopped
short of requiring directly as a substantive matter the provision of social
benefits such as voting rights or appeal rights. One can imagine the
Court concluding that any state government could be constitutionally
legitimate only if it was the product of meaningful democratic self-
determination, or that a criminal conviction required an appellate
opportunity as a matter of constitutional due process.
The fact of the matter is that the Warren Court went right up to the
edge of some dramatically new constitutional interpretations, but
ultimately pulled back. Perhaps the most vivid example is another case
that Raskin's argument deploys, Shapiro v. Thompson.0° In Shapiro, the
Court struck down state residency prerequisites for the receipt of
welfare benefits on the ground that such residency requirements
unconstitutionally burdened the right to travel. The case presented the
possibility that the Constitution could be read to include a right to
minimal income, to welfare benefits themselves. We could imagine the
structure of such an opinion basing a right to welfare support on, say,
the ability to participate in democratic self-determination, or on the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religious belief. You cannot,
as a practical matter, participate in the marketplace of ideas, or in the
political process, or in religious exercise, if your life is taken up in trying
to feed and shelter yourself. Subsistence support, at the very least,
might have been recognized as the matrix for the enjoyment of virtually
any other constitutional right. Instead, as in Griffin and Harper, the
Court held that, although the Constitution required no welfare
program whatsoever, if a state chose to provide welfare, it could not
discriminate on the basis of residency.
Why was it that the Warren Court stopped short and declined to
recognize an egalitarian based right to participate in the election
process through, say, public funding, or a substantively grounded set of
prerequisites for criminal convictions, or a subsistence support right?
Part of the answer is that the Warren Court was itself constrained by
conventional notions that unelected judges lacked the legitimacy to
impose dramatic changes in social policy, part of the answer also could
be found in the idea that practical enforcement of far-reaching
constitutional reform would not have been available.
But my sense is that these frustrating limitations on the reach of
Warren Court reform flowed from a real limitation of legal and political
vision, an inability to transcend a constrained view of the American
Constitution as one guaranteeing negative rather than affirmative
60. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
[Vol. 48:589
D.C. VOTING RIGHTS SYMPOSIUM
rights, and a widely held belief that, were it otherwise, there would be
no limitation to judicial power.
Yet the cases I've alluded to-where the Court came right up to the
point of recognizing affirmative rights and seemed to be very close to
reading the Constitution as granting effective, real world rights rather
than merely formal and negative rights against state action-those cases
have never been overruled. They exist as formally good precedent,
available to be woven together to construct various formally compelling
arguments that seem to require dramatic changes in law. The
argument for the recognition of a constitutional right for District
residents to vote for representatives in Congress is just such an attempt.
If, as Raskin and the Corporation Counsel have done, you put together
the one person, one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sirnt' together with
Wesberry v. Sanders64 2 and Evans v. Cornman, there is a formally correct
argument (I think more convincing with respect to the House of
Representatives than the Senate) that the current exclusion of District
residents from participation in congressional elections is
unconstitutional.
So, as a constitutional law "expert," I would say that these are formally
compelling legal arguments. Yet, we all have a sense in the room that
winning this case would be surprising and unexpected. Again, in a
formal legal sense, victory would be surprising because the cases relied
on are the most liberal of the Warren Court period-and while they
have never been formally reversed, it is clear that, in the currect legal
climate, they are unlikely to be extended or seen as the basis for the
kind of analogical reasoning that Raskin proposes.
There is also a suggestion in Raskin's essay that racism is at work-
hostility to District voting rights cannot be separated from the racial
composition of the city. Once we begin looking beyond the analytics of
the legal arguments to the social and cultural context of the District,
however, we are confronted not simply with "racism" as an explanation,
but with a much more encompassing situation of "colonialism," a
context that, in my view, demands that we evaluate the meaning of
"voting" in the wider context of power relations in the city.
What we have in the District of Columbia is a more or less classic case
of colonialism, of an old style eighteenth and nineteenth-century
colonialism. The biggest mark of that colonialism, the most obvious
from our twentieth-century liberal eyes, is the denial of formal self-
determination, denial of the formal right to vote. But this is only the
61. 377 US. 533 (1964).
62. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
63. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
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most formal element of the kind of colonialism that exists in the District
of Columbia.
This is like a college town. If you read The Washington Post daily, you
won't get any sense of the texture of life in the District of Columbia.
You'll get a sense of as if it is a college town, and you'll get a sense of
what happens at the college. The college is the Federal Government.
You could even mistake the fact that Washington, D.C. is a majority
black city if you read The Washington Post. It doesn't seem to be. All the
important news is about what white people are doing.
The other sense of colonization is the sense of disempowerment that
partly, I think, comes from a denial of the right to vote. But it is only a
small piece of it. Think, for example, of the 1968 riots following the
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. The late Kwame Ture,
formerly known as Stokely Carmichael, led a large group of African-
Americans through 14th Street in the former business district before it
was burned down in the riots. The first thing that they tried to do early
on the first night of the riots upon hearing of King's assassination was to
go from store to store-virtually all of the stores were white-owned and
white-staffed-asking, "Would you please close down the store?"
This didn't start as destruction, it didn't start as fires, it didn't start as
looting. It just started as a request to close down the store. What this
episode signifies to me is some attempt to exercise some power in a
situation in which you don't have power, that is, some negative sense
you have got to close down or we are going to tear the city down, just
close down. Close the schools tomorrow, which didn't happen and
exacerbated the climate in D.C. the next day. Close down so that we
can exercise some power. But the power to close stores and the power
to vote doesn't make self-determination.
Think about when Central America was rife with revolutionary
energy in the 1970s. The United States, as part of a de-radicalization
movement, supported in El Salvador, say, the right wing dictatorship's
"land reform." The land reform was in some ways very dramatic: All
the big plantations had to be broken down and turned into farmer and
worker cooperatives which would then own and work the land.
I think that was just a de-radicalizing measure. It wasn't really a
revolutionary thing in El Salvador. But think about Washington, D.C.
in these terms. Think about the population density of where African
American and Latino people live in Washington, D.C. and where white
people live. That is just the density issue. If you look at a map, you
64. In the 1960's, Stokely Carmichael changed his name to Kwame Ture to signify a newfound
freedom. S&-Omi Leissner, Namingthe Unheard Of, 15 NAT'LBLAcKLJ. 109,153 (1997-98).
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could not help notice all the land that white people have and the
limited amount of land that people of color have in D.C.
We need, in addition to the right to vote, land reform. We should
just start breaking down those parcels. If you have got a big parcel and
people are crowded in another part of the city, well doesn't it seem
right as we leave colonization and enter self determination that those
pieces of land in Northwest would not be expropriated, as part of a
post-colonial reform.
Again, this was a minor reform in El Salvador. It wasn't the radical
revolution. It was a minor reform instituted by a right wing government
to forestall subversion. In D.C., the colony continues. Therefore,
despite the insurrectional riots lasting for four days after the killing of
Martin Luther King and led by some of the most gifted leadership that
the African American community has ever had, no land reform took
place, no material redistribution of wealth took place. No major
redistribution of political power, except for the fickle granting of home
rule, took place in D.C.
So to sum this up-and I hope I have a little chance to elaborate in a
few minutes-I think the voting rights legal argument is right as a
constitutional law matter. Yes, it is correct. There should be a right to
vote. You can construct an argument out of constitutional precedent
that insists that it is correct.
I also think that we all know that this is at least an uphill proposition
to get a court to hold this way. Part of the background reason that we
know this to be true is that the District of Columbia is in many ways-
racial, economic, cultural-a classic kind of colony. When we think of
struggling against colonial power, we need to think more broadly than
simply the symbolic act of allowing the residents to punch holes in
pieces of paper behind a curtain in a privatized and atomized ritual.
After all, as many of us remember, the citizens of South Vietnam,
when the United States had an interest in making that country look like
a democracy, were marched out of their villages and hamlets under the
shadow of bayonets to participate in a ritual of American democracy.
So I want to say that I support this voting rights struggle as a legal
matter and as a political matter. I would caution us to keep our eye on
the kind of realities of what real redistribution of racial and economic
power in a place like the District of Columbia would look like.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Thanks so much, Professor Peller. Ed Still.
PROFESSOR STILL: Gosh, trying to follow Professor Peller is a
tough job. Various images came to mind as he was speaking. I was
thinking of Doctor Zhivago coming back to his big house after the
revolution and finding that he now only had one room that he shared
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with his entire family.
I was thinking, "Well, there is a lot of room in West Virginia, and
maybe we could move everybody out of Washington into West Virginia."
Then it occurred to me that is what the Khmer Rouge tried to do.
Then I remembered that we are here to talk about voting rights in the
District of Columbia, and I stopped that reverie. So let me try to get us
back down to what I consider to be a practical level about things and
talk really about this wonderful phrase "springing constitutional right."
I think that given the text of the Constitution, that Professor Gardner
is correct, that these are springing constitutional rights, because I think
in many ways that Representative Bingham was right. In the way the
Constitution is written, there is no substantive right to vote.
But-and the "buts" are always very important to lawyers-we have
reached the practical point that the springing constitutional right (that
is, what I would have called an equal protection right to vote) is as good
as a substantive right in which the Constitution guaranteed "every
person shall have the right to representation." Or as the American
Declaration of Rights says: "Every person has the right to self
determination and to representation in the national legislature."" That
is what we are really arguing about.
But let's think about it this way. When the Constitution was written,
of course, it is always said that even most white men couldn't vote.
There is a paper I picked up at the American Political Science
Association meeting a month ago that disputes that, and I have to
analyze that argument more thoroughly.
But let's just assume that, that is correct and that women couldn't
vote except in NewJersey, and blacks couldn't vote most places. (The
vast majority of them couldn't vote because they weren't even
considered to be citizens of the United States.) Persons under twenty-
one couldn't vote.
So now, what do we have now? We now have a constitutional
amendment that says you cannot discriminate against people in the
right to vote solely because of race. You can't discriminate on the basis
of gender. You can't discriminate on the basis of age if the person is
over the age eighteen.
But nevertheless, the original Constitution and the Seventeenth
Amendment still say the right to vote for the House of Representatives
is dependent upon the suffrage provision of the state for its most
numerous legislative branch. The Seventeenth Amendment says the
same thing about the right to vote for senators. So textually, there is no
65. SeeAmerican Dedaration, supra note 14.
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substantive right to vote.
But given the equal protection branch of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, the diminution of anybody's light to vote can generally
be challenged on the basis that there is a denial of equal protection
because we have allowed so many other people to vote, either by
constitutional amendment or by statutory practice.
For instance, there is a statute in Alabama that was just recently
passed that I think inadvertently decreased the number of people who
could vote by absentee ballot. It used to say that you had the right to
get an absentee-well, they could send you an absentee ballot. You had
a right to vote by absentee ballot under, let's say, section one. Under
section two, it says, "Here is how we deliver the absentee ballot to you.
We will send it to your residence or your usual place of receiving mail,
or you can pick it up in person." They just amended the statute to take
out the provision about your usual place of receiving mail because they
want it to delivered to your home as a way of an anti-fraud provision.
But doesn't that create two classes of people, one of whom gets mail
delivered to their home, and another of whom doesn't get mail
delivered to their home? Now those of us who live in urban areas and
live on the west side of Rock Creek Park, don't have much problem
about getting our mail delivered to us.
But there are places even in this city where people can't reliably
receive their mail at their residence address because people come
around and steal things out of their mailbox all the time. So they walk
down to the post office and get it
There are small towns in America where people don't get mail
delivery as a matter of convenience for the post office because they
don't want to hire carriers. Subsequently, we did win this argument, at
least in obtaining an injunction under Section Five of the Voting Rights
Act.6 So in that situation, we can make an argument that people who
have to receive mail at a post office box or at general delivery have been
denied equal protection. That is as good as having a substantive right
to vote if we can win with that argument
In the same way, I think that Raskin's argument is that people in the
District of Columbia should have the same right to vote for members of
Congress that people in Virginia and Maryland have. It doesn't have to
be a substantive right. It just has to be the same as other places and will
depend upon those other places as having an expansive right.
Similarly, we would make the argument nowadays that people have the,
any particular class of people, have the same right to vote as somebody
66. SeeWard v. Alabama, 31 F. Supp. 2d 968 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (threejudge court).
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else. Since voting is a fundamental right, and strict scrutiny applies,
then the government has the responsibility to show that they have some
sort of overriding interest that trumps this interest of the citizen in the
fundamental right to vote.
The genius of Professor Raskin's argument is that he reminds
everyone that those of us who live in the District of Columbia are
American citizens, and therefore have the rights of American citizens,
even though we may not be residents of Maryland or Virginia, and that
one of those rights of American citizenship is the right to be
represented in Congress.
So, I would look at it from a very practical standpoint and say that the
springing constitutional right is good enough to get us what we want,
which is a victory for this lawsuit and particularly, the right to vote for
members of Congress, both the House and the Senate, because
everybody else in America has that right. Those who do not are non-
citizens or those disenfranchised for a criminal conviction.
But fundamentally speaking, we are in the same situation as the vast
majority. We have the same American rights as other people do.
Therefore, we ought to have the same right to vote that they do. On
that very practical basis, I would argue that we do have a constitutional
right to vote and to be represented.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Thank you, Mr. Still. I will complete with
Brenda Wright.
MS. WRIGHT: Thank you. So much has been said that is so
provocative and insightful. I guess I want to start by going back to Jeff
Rosen's description of Congressman Bingham's view of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. I was very struck by it, because as I was
preparing for this event, I felt it was necessary to open my old
constitutional law textbook and take another look at the Slaughterhouse
Cases to make sure I really knew what the holding was.
In that textbook, which was Professor Gunther's edition, he describes
the observations of someone who participated in those debates. I can't
remember the identity of the person right now. He says that the phrase
"privileges and immunities" was indeed made up by Congressman
Bingham, but that he never explained what he meant by it, and that
indeed "its euphony and indefiniteness of meaning were a charm" to
Congressman Bingham..
67. 83 US. 36 (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). The Slaughterhouse Cases encompass the cases below:
(1) Butcher's BenevoLnt Ass'n of Nn Orleans v. Cresent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co. and
(2) Estden v. Louisiana
68. See GERALD GUNTHER, CoNSrrrunrONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 503 n.* (9th ed.
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I think what is so striking about that-and Ijust happened to see this
in a footnote that Professor Gunther wrote to the Slaughterhouse
Casesd-is that it illustrates for us how constitutional interpretation, the
seeds of dispute about the meaning of phrases such as this, are there
from the very beginning.
The dispute is not only between the original Framers and those
looking at the Constitution from our twentieth-century perspective.
The dispute is indeed already there among the participants in the
constitutional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment. That has been
a hallmark of American constitutional interpretation. Even the authors
of the provisions are not always trustworthy and infallible guides to the
meaning of these provisions.
Looking at the history of the development of voting rights in
American constitutional law, one is struck by the fact that Jeff alluded
to, that the status quo that in one generation or in many generations
appears to be absolutely inviolable and unchangeable, eventually we
find ourselves looking back on those very institutions with incredulity
that they ever existed. The poll tax is an example of that
From the twentieth-century perspective, the late twentieth-century
perspective, it appears a laughable anachronism to think that the
requirement of paying a poll tax could ever have been a permissible
condition for exercising the right to vote. Yet the Supreme Court twice
upheld the constitutionality of the poll tax, as Professor Raskin has
pointed out in his other articles, before finally striking it down in Harper
v. Virginia State Board ofElections.7
One of the debates that I was reminded of over the poll tax,
occurred, I think, in the 1950s. I saw an account of this not too long
ago. There was a debate between Claude Pepper, who was arguing
against the poll tax, and a defender of the poll tax. This debate is
recounted by none other than Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was there
as an observer at the time.
He reported that the individual defending the poll tax pointed out
that anyone who really wanted to exercise the right to vote surely could
not be deterred by the necessity of paying a dollar, which is all the tax
really was in a lot of the states where it existed.
Moynihan recounted that his heart sank when this argument was
made because it seemed essentially irrefutable. The idea that having to
1975) (quoting Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Undeistanding, 2 SrAN. L REV. 5 (1949)).
69. See id.
70. 383 U.S. 633 (1966). The Supreme Court had previously upheld the constitutionality of
the poll tax in Breedlovev. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) and Butler v. Thompson, 341 US. 937 (1951).
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pay a dollar would deter anyone who would really want to vote seemed
very difficult to defend. But Claude Pepper ambled up to the
microphone and said, 'Vell, a dollar ain't much if you got one.
71
I think that illustrates how in just a few words a structure that had
been accepted up until a particular moment, its very conceptual and
moral foundation can crumble by the use of a few well chosen words.
I came across some words that I think have a bearing on this debate
that I wanted to bring to your attention as part of this symposium, and
they are the words of Abraham Lincoln. In his very brief dictum, he
says, "As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This
expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the
extent of the difference, is no democracy."7
What do those words mean for the debate we have about the District
of Columbia? I don't invoke the notion of slavery just as an exciting
rhetorical device. I invoke this phrase because I think it speaks to the
fundamental conception we must have about democracy in America.
What it tells us is that democracy is not simply a matter of an
individual right, that it is also a matter of the collective relationship of
citizens to each other, and that the absence of democracy, the denial of
democracy to any one group of citizens within the United States, denies
the reality of democracy to the entire citizenry of the United States.
What it means in practical terms is this. I am now a resident of
Massachusetts. As a resident of Massachusetts I can vote for my
representative to Congress, and that representative then can pass laws
and policies which are binding on the people of the District of
Columbia, who themselves have no say and can give no consent to those
policies.
That relationship places me in what I find to be a morally and
politically indefensible position of being, in essence, a master over
another group of American citizens who lack the basic rights of
citizenship. So this dictum of Abraham Lincoln's reminds us that the
denial of suffrage to the residents of the District of Columbia is not
merely a denial of their rights, but it is a signal of the failure of
American democracy for the entire country.
So I think we almost have to end up redefining the question here. It
is not simply whether the Constitution guarantees a right to vote. The
question, if you look at it from this perspective, is: Does the American
Constitution require in essence the abject failure of democracy?
I think that the entire history of the development of constitutional
71. The debate is recounted in Todd S. Purdum, Tryinga Constitutional Track to Curb Campaign
Spending; N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,1994, atA28.
72. LINCOLN, supra note 10, at 532.
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principles in this country tells us that the answer has to be no.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Thank you very much indeed, Brenda Wright.
I was asked to pose a general question to each of our panelists for a
brief rebuttal, and then we will open up the discussion to questions.
One thing that struck me in each of the presentations was the tension
between the modem notion of the right to vote as a collective right, a
right governing the collective relation of citizens to each other, and the
nineteenth-century vision of individual rights or privileges or
immunities.
The broad question I'd like to pose to each of the panelists is: Can
this collective right be comfortably shoe-homed into an Equal
Protection Clause that the Supreme Court tells us today is
fundamentally individualistic in its concerns?
Isn't this, James Gardner, much of the source of the incoherence of
modem voting rights doctrine? Don't we have the worst of both
worlds?
You said that the Court has been fundamentally originalist in leaving
the states plenary control over the suffrage. But at the same time that
they have refused to recognize a fundamental right to vote, haven't they
also discovered a color blindness requirement in the Shaw v. RenJ3 and
Miller v. Johnson74 cases, plucked out of its historical context and
superimposed on the collective right to vote, which the Framers never
had any intention to regulate in this manner? Haven't the justices, by
being bad originalists, given us the worst of both worlds?
Gary Peller talked about the egalitarian right to participate in the
political process and presented us with the notion of an effective vote in
its most bracing formulation. My question to him is how precisely this
could be adjudicated under the individualistic Equal Protection Clause
as we understand it today?
What would be the baseline for measuring the source of the
egalitarian political power, short of something like proportional
representation, which is the baseline that the Court keeps shying away
from in its voting rights cases?
And how could our textual Constitution, regardless of the intentions
of individual Framers, be reconciled with this bracing vision?
Ed Still talked about the Equal Protection Clause as adequate to
guarantee ballot access in an age in which many other groups have
been encompassed within the frameworks of suffrage. But I wonder,
since he has done such important work in this context, whether he is
73. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
74. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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equally confident that the Equal Protection Clause can comfortably
adjudicate vote dilution claims and Shaw claims and the range of claims
beyond pure ballot access.
I love Brenda Wright's discovery of Congressman George Boutwell.
He was a Massachusetts Republican who was a seething rival of
Bingham. Boutwell's quotation is often cited by judicial conservatives,
most notably Alexander Bickel, who want to argue that the Bill of Rights
is not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 They cite his
statement to argue that, in fact, we don't really know what privileges or
immunities means, so it's best not incorporate.
I wonder, Brenda Wright, whether you think that this collective right
of citizens to relate to each other can be comfortably and intelligibly
adjudicated within the Equal Protection Clause, or whether we need
some sort of new paradigm to sort out analytical confusion of case law.
Let me ask our panelists for brief comments, and then we'll begin
questions.
PROFESSOR GARDNER- Well, I forgot my question.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: But that was the point of giving you a long
one.
PROFESSOR GARDNER- The question deals with conceiving of
voting as a group right rather than as an individual right. Well, in a
sense I think that is the wrong question. You know, I would have my law
professor membership card revoked if I didn't respond by criticizing
the question.
I think the right to vote needs to be looked at in relation to what it is
for. Why do we have it? What purpose is it designed to serve? I don't
think it is possible to say anything that is inherent in voting as far as its
relationship to groups or individuals. It entirely depends why we have a
particular regime of voting and what it is supposed to do.
Having said that though, I think that Professor Rosen is right. Part of
the confusion is that the Court, by using the Equal Protection Clause,
instead of deriving from the structure of the document a substantive
right and making it instead a relative right, has put the question in a
way that invites comparisons between what one person or one group
has and what other individuals or other groups have.
There is only one way to make an equal protection claim, and that is
to say that here is something that these other people have, and I don't
have it. But that really begs the question whether what the other
people have is the right amount of political influence because I take it
75. See GEORGES. BOUTWELL, 2 REMINISCENCES OF SIMxyYEARS IN PUBLIc AFFAIRS 41-42 (1902)
(stating that Congressman Bingham arrived at the term "Privileges and Immunities" because of the
term's "euphonius and indefiniteness of meaning").
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that we have a system of voting for the purpose of instituting a formal
system of popular control over government. So yes, I think it is right
that the Court has sort of smuggled in this notion of voting as a group
right and then is trying to paper over it.
PROFESSOR PELLER- The question about how the court could
fashion out of the Equal Protection Clause a collective as opposed to
individual rights I think has been answered again by some of the cases
of the Warren Court. The Warren Court went pretty far along in
demonstrating that it is not inconceivable, it is not crazy, the garbage
will still be picked up if you interpret the Constitution according to a
real world, realistic, effective notion of what is going on in the world, as
opposed to a false, formalistic, individualistic notion.
So the question to me is not so much would it be possible to infuse
equal protection with collective norms. Part of the reason for moving
in that direction from an analytic and jurisprudential point of view is
that there is no way to read the American Constitution to provide any
semblance of equality and individual rights. How could it be that there
is no right to education, and yet the sense is that we all have a right to
compete as individuals in some kind of free marketplace? It doesn't
make any sense as an ideological legitimater, and it certainly doesn't
make any sense as a practical take on what is going on in American
society at the close of the twentieth-century.
The difficulty we are in now is that the Warren Court cases that
pointed the way towards an egalitarian, effective vision of democratic
self-determination have been repudiated. It is not that they didn't
work. It is not that they were bizarre or crazy, you know. They are still
in the case books. We still teach them. Wejust teach them as, well, they
have been cabined in this way and curtailed this way.
So what we have here is not a constitution that needs to be read for
its inner logic or inner truth or what the Framers really meant. What
we have is an ideological struggle over a symbolic chartering document,
the American Constitution. The ideological struggle can point with
references to precedent that supports this side or that side.
There is left wing support for collective, realistic self-determination
and a democracy infused with the empowerment of people from all
walks of life. There is clearly precedent for a pinched and narrow view
of a kind of democracy that would be a democracy in form only.
Ideological struggle will determine which of these-and there are more
visions than that-but which vision of the many that are contained in
the document and in the precedent, which vision will reign in
American constitutional law.
PROFESSOR STILL: This question of the individual right to vote
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versus the collective right to vote is one that has come home to Brenda
Wright and me and the other people who have worked for the Voting
Rights Project of the Lawyers' Committee because we have had to deal
with it in the context of cases in which we are trying to empower black
and other minority voters.
The Court is taking the position that there is this individual right to
vote that is somehow differentiated from a group ight to vote. But
then you look at the other jurisprudence in relationship to voting in
election cases.
The Supreme Court held just about a year ago, a year and a half ago,
in the Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party6 case that Minnesota could
ban fusion candidates. One of the reasons they gave for that was
because they wanted to preserve the two party system, the vitality of the
two parties. Similarly, in the Burdick v. Takushz case, the Hawaii case
involving the ban on write-in votes, the effect of that was to put an
emphasis on getting a party nomination or going through the process
and getting an independent ballot slot by petition or some other
method.
So the point of both of those, however, is that they respect the idea
that there will be collective action by people who call themselves a
political party. Similarly, in Shaw v. Ren 8 and the other cases, since
then, United States v. Hays," Miller v. Johnson,"0 Shaw v. Hunt,"' Bush v.
Vera,82 they do not ever identify an individual right that has been
violated in some way, that is, in the sense that there is an individual
harm to a person. How was Ms. Shaw harmed?
She never did explain that being in Mel Watts' district versus
somebody else's district harmed her in some way. She was not required
to prove that in any way. So the Court said that she was really talking
about an expressive harm, which I think is just another way of talking
about a group right.
So apparently Republicans, Democrats, and white people have group
rights; black people have individual rights, according to the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which I think just shows you some
of the results-oriented reasoning you get in these various cases from the
Supreme Court.
MS. WRIGHT: I think the question to me was do we need a
76. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
77. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
78. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
79. 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
80. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
81. 517U.S. 899 (1996).
82. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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paradigm other than the Fourteenth Amendment, or is the Fourteenth
Amendment adequate to the task at hand. I think I lean with those who
say that the Fourteenth Amendment is more than adequate, had the
Court not made some fundamental mistakes in its interpretation of
several of its provisions, including that of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.
I guess Ijust want to recommend to everyone here on that question a
wonderful book by Professor Charles Black called A New Birth of Freedom:
Human Rights Named and Unnamed.8 He just published it last year, I
believe. It is the best exposition that I know of the Supreme Court's
gross historical mistake in interpreting the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to have essentially no content, as
well as in interpreting the Ninth Amendment, which says that
enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution shall not be deemed
to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people.
If you want to see an elegant, beautifully constructed, logical, rational
argument as to the historical mistake made by the Supreme Court in
the Slaughterhouse Cases and in other cases, I highly recommend that
book to you. I think it, along with works such as Professor Raskin's,
illustrates that the Fourteenth Amendment is adequate to the task at
hand. The question is whether our political and judicial institutions are
adequate to the task at hand.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Thanks so much. We got a late start, so I
think we have just under ten minutes for questions, and I would like to
invite them now. Sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER. Hello. Can you hear me?
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Yes, indeed.
AUDIENCE MEMBER. I am Larry Morel with the Committee for the
Capital City. I agree with Professor Still that procedural due process is
enough to win this case. I think that this legal challenge has a real
possibility to win on procedural grounds of equal protection.
But I wanted to ask the panel if they would address what I think is the
strongest argument of all, and that is the second half of Clause
Seventeen of Section Eight of the first article of the Constitution, which
has to do with the federal enclaves.
That provision says that like authority-Congress shall exercise like
authority over the federal enclaves as it exercises over the District of
Columbia.a The courts have held and Congress has enacted laws giving
83. CHARLES L BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS NAMED AND UNNAMED
(1997).
84. 86U.S.36 (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
85. SeeU.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ("[T]o exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by
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the right of people living in the federal enclaves-that is what the Evans
v. Cornman case 6 was all about-to vote in the states in which those
enclaves were located.
I would like to ask the panel to address what they see here in that
clause for an equal protections argument
PROFESSOR STILL: Well, let me speak to that because that was an
issue that I have looked at some. Clause Seventeen says Congress has
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the District of Columbia and over "all
places purchased ... for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-
yards, and other needful buildings.""' Under that provision, the people
who live at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, who were not
allowed to vote by Montgomery County, brought Evans, and the
Supreme Court held they were entitled to register and vote in
Maryland. Similarly, people who happen to live on the premises of
Andrews Air Force Base are allowed to vote in Maryland as well.
I can't see a distinction between-well, there are some distinctions,
but I will choose not to see them-between the National Institutes of
Health and the District of Columbia. One distinction could be made
that the District of Columbia is so large that it actually has a local
government Well, since we don't have much of a local government at
the moment, maybe we are more like the National Institutes of Health.
I would have used the Evans v. Cornman argument ifI were seeking to
have the District of Columbia residents be allowed to vote in Maryland,
specifically because I think that we need that group right of being able
to vote collectively and to take care of the special interest that we have.
But I will turn the special status of the District around and say it is
because of that special status of the District that we should be allowed to
vote for a member of Congress on our own, not as part of Maryland,
and for senators on our own, and not as part of Maryland.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Any other questions? We'll catch somebody
over there.
AUDIENCE MEMBER- I am Anne Leiko, and I have more of a
comment than a question. I guess it is Professor Peller's comments
about the colonial status of the District of Columbia, which I agree with
immeasurably.
I do think though that it is distorting the whole argument to cast it in
racial terms. For all of us in this room who are at least forty years of age,
the majority African American status of the city has only come in our
the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings[.]").
86. See398 U.S. 419 (1970).
87. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cd. 17.
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lifetime.
I have at home a picture of my great grandfather in 1881 showing
Pennsylvania Avenue flooded, and he is standing in a boat in front of it
decrying the state of the District of Columbia after Congress has
revoked at that point the territorial government and is ruling the city,
and our lack of representation and what it has done to the city.
So I think the status of the citizens of the District of Columbia go to
whatever they are. Its racial composition and ethnic composition has
changed over time, and is still changing. The fundamental unfairness
of us not having a right to vote, both locally and nationally, has been
the same for almost 200 years.
So the fact that there is a racial element for some members of
Congress or some in the population who think that that justifies
anything is, I think, more a smokescreen for what the fundamental
problems are of lack of representation for all citizens, whoever they are.
PROFESSOR PELLER- I appreciate that the lack of formal voting
representation preceded the racial status of the District. But
respectfully, I would-I believe that the reason that the status has not
been cured has a lot to do with the racial and class perception of the
District by everybody in the Congress and the rest of the country.
So I hear what you are saying. I disagree though. I think that if the
District were a relatively wealthy, upper middle class, white territory that
a lot of things would be different, and probably voting is one of them.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Are there any more questions? Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But based on history though, doesn't it show
that regardless of the races that were prominent, that we did not have a
fair recognition from Congress? They would have to do so many things
that were showing that they were taking the inalienable rights of the
citizens, be they white or what, males, and shoving them aside and not
allowing due process to go on.
PROFESSOR PELLER: I think you all are making a very similar
point. I agree that the right to vote has been denied on a very fair and
integrated basis. I guess that is the way to say it.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Sir, Mr. Plotkin.
MR. PLOTKIN: My name is Mark Plotkin. I would like to ask
Professor Gardner, because you in some way prepared us for a decision
that would be--did you call it or did Professor Peller call it a loser?
PROFESSOR PELLER: I said an uphill struggle. That was deleted
from the proceedings.
MR. PLOTKIN: I want to brace myself for this horrible decision
written by the Supreme Court. You are all law professors and learned
men. Write that decision and give me the legal reasoning that-excuse
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me, Mr. Gardner, that you said stinks-that you could write the
decision, that we will have another panel discussion talking about a
horrible Supreme Court decision because I would like to hear-I really
mean this-creatively and supposedly legally how they could justify a
ruling against this case.
PROFESSOR GARDNER: Well, I can't--
MR- PLOTKIN: BeJustice Rehnquist.
PROFESSOR GARDNER: Oh, no, please. Actually, before I started
teaching, I was a litigator with the Justice Department Civil Division in
the branch that is probably going to be defending this suit. So I could
tell you how I would write the brief opposing it. I guess the whole thing
turns in that sense on one word in the Constitution. It is the word
"State." Article I, Section Two, and Article I, Section Three say that
members of Congress shall be elected by the people of the "states." The
District is not a "state." End of argument.
Now, you know-
PROFESSOR STILL: Is your brief going to be that short?
PROFESSOR GARDNER: Yeah. It depends very much-to make
that kind of argument and make it stick, you really have to play up text.
You have to say: listen, the way you decide these cases is text. You can
look at other stuff in some kinds of situations where the text isn't clear.
But here the text is unmistakably clear, and just don't look beyond it.
That to me is where the case stands or falls.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Last question, Professor Gillette.
PROFESSOR GILLET1TE: I was a little hesitant to speak again. But I
think Mr. Peller and Ms. Wright have provided the properjuxtaposition
of the discourse that I was seeking. This is part of a discourse that I
think is terribly necessary. If we take Professor Peller's question, what
difference will the vote mean anyway, I agree totally that the vote in
itself cannot transform the District of Columbia's status.
If we take that position as a relatively narrow issue, I think we are
really cornered in a situation where we will not have a proper
resolution. What I see as a breakthrough this morning in terms of
conceptualizing this, in the bold and powerful statement from Ms.
Wright, is that this is not an issue that we ask in isolation in the District
of Columbia, but of the whole United States.
If you think about it in the most practical terms-and I have had
speakers in my classes who have actually defended the position which
seems to me extraordinarily narrow-that there should be no
commuter tax in the District of Columbia because the Congress says
that shall be so.
So, if you really want to get down to it, two states, Maryland and
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Virginia, are holding up the entire United States Congress from making
a simple change in the way in which Congress oversees this colonial
territory, which might give the District of Columbia a greater position of
financial security.
That position can be maintained because the country is not yet
thinking of itself in a master relationship, as Ms. Wright has said, to say
this is wrong. Instead, it is allowing two states to hold up the rest of the
Congress in the exercise of a basic right of taxation.
I would hope very strongly that we would move towards embracing
Ms. Wright's position and see this not as the District of Columbia solely
seeking its rights, but seeing how the failure to achieve these rights is
really diminishing the whole country.
I really want to commend her statement. I think it is extraordinarily
important.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Why don't we give the last word to Brenda
Wright.
MS. WRIGHT: Well, I think that my reason for bringing forward the
observation of Abraham Lincoln about the meaning of democracy is
simply to recognize that the history of constitutional reform litigation in
this country has always, for its success, depended on a core of moral
rightness to the cause being represented in that constitutional
litigation.
It has depended on the entire country becoming aware of the
necessity of that reform to its own moral authority, just as watching the
pictures of the protestors in Alabama being bombarded by fire hoses
woke up the country to the immorality ofJim Crow.
We have the necessity, that probably has not been met yet, of
awakening the country to the injustice of the current arrangements. I
think that one of the pieces of work that is unfinished here is
articulating and making the rest of the country understand its stake in
this battle on behalf of the District's residents.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Thank you so much, Brenda Wright Thank
you all for a fascinating and useful panel. Please join me in thanking
our panelists.
HOST: Ladies and gentlemen, we will take a short break while we
prepare for the debate, and meet back in here in about ten minutes.
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